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Abstract
Despite the on-set on new divisions, there is a strong case to be made for the view
that ultimately Europe is more united than divided. There is still significant continuity
with the post-war project of reconstruction and peace and that this common
ground that constitutes the European heritage needs to be given greater
recognition. One of the defining features of European self-understanding is
opposition to war.
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Is Europe more united today than divided? This, in the most general terms, is the
question I pose and seek to answer.1 I shall state my argument before I look, in the
second part of my essay, at the nature of divisions: despite the on-set on new divisions,
there is a strong case to be made for the view that ultimately Europe is more united
than divided. The term united can of course mean different things. It does not mean,
and I certainly do not intend it to mean, politically united in the sense, for example,
that in 1990 Germany became united. To a degree, the post-second world war project
of European integration has brought about the integration of economic and other
steering mechanisms. The single currency is one such example, even if it also has
engendered new divisions.
Europe is united in a different and more philosophical sense and for which a longer his-
torical perspective is needed. Since the end of the first world war European intellectuals
became increasingly aware of both common bonds that united the war torn European
countries and the need to build upon their shared heritage Harrington (2016), Rosenboim
(2017). That commitment did not stop the descent into the worst war in the history of
human societies, but offered a legacy on which Europe could rebuild itself after 1945.
This heritage is still with us and has grown to encompass wide social strata. Until
recently, the idea of Europe was the aspiration of elites, political and intellectual elites of
both the right and the left. Initially it was more attractive to the right, but came to be
accepted by the left.
Today the idea of Europe is part of the self-understanding of very large segments of
the population, in particular of young people, who have been born as European
citizens. Letting aside, for now, the extent of the Europeanisation of identities, the
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important point is that since 1945, but going back the interwar-period, a cognitive shift
occurred that had far-reaching political and cultural significance. After 1945 the idea of
Europe came to signify a profound opposition to war, as in the phrase Nie Wieder,
‘never again war’. The generation who forged the project of European integration that
culminated in the Treaty of Rome was animated by the belief in the need to create a
lasting peace in a continent that had within, living memory, witnessed three wars. That
sense of what Strath (2016) has called a ‘utopia of peace’ has lost its force today, now
that the goal has been achieved and the memory of the war no longer is a living or
collective memory. However, I argue that the essential utopia of peace has survived and
has entered the historical memory of Europeans in ways that are not always evident but
exert a strong influence.
In my book The European Heritage, I argued that one of the defining features of
European self-understanding since 1945 is opposition to war. War within Europe has
become a thing of the past (Delanty 2018). Significant progress has been made in re-
solving the last vestige of military conflict within the European area over Turkish occu-
pation of Cyprus. Despite the danger posed by Brexit, civil war in Northern Ireland is
not likely to reoccur. External war is not to be discounted, as in the case of Iraq war in
2003, but here too there is little appetite for armed conflict. The world-wide tendency
is towards an increase in civil strife within nations rather than between them. This is
vividly reflected in the resurgence of the question of Catalan independence, but in this
case, as the example of Corsican nationalism also attests, there is little appetite for
violence.
This is all in stark contrast to the turbulent and often violent history of Europe. The
past seventy years has been remarkably peaceful and which can be seen as a part of a
world-wide trend towards the relative decrease in violence. The exception is the war
that followed the break-up of the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. It is of course
the case that for several decades this peace existed within the context of a political
order of dictatorships. Yet, with the exception of war in the former Yugoslavia, the
transition has been remarkably peaceful. The spread of democracy – since 1980 in the
Iberian Peninsula and after 1990 in central and eastern Europe – has made it possible
for Europe to re-appraise its history and forge a new self-understanding. This cannot
be from the position of having reached the ‘end of history’ since this period has been
marked by events that while largely peaceful have been nonetheless tumultuous. There
may no longer be a major clash of political ideologies, but there is a cultural clash of
identities and of socio-cultural milieus, as is evident from Brexit Britain today and the
disturbing trend towards authoritarian democracy in Poland and Hungary. While a
newly found unity has been attained in peace, new divisions have resulted from the very
means that made this peace possible. Democracy does not overcome differences. It
makes possible pluralisation and rights based claims. It also makes possible the reinter-
pretation of the past as the received accounts are discredited or contested. It has cre-
ated the conditions in which the legacy of history can be examined from positions that
previously were silenced. This situation when combined with the wider transformation
of culture has opened up political community to new challenges.
It is thus my contention that since 1945 opposition to war has been a growing
principle that has united Europeans and could be said to be the defining element in
contemporary European self-understanding. It is a significant basis of European solidarity
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and can also be seen, following Walter Benjamin, as an expression of anamnestic solidar-
ity with the victims of history. Anti-war solidarity made possible the largest protests in
European history in 2003 when millions of people took to the streets on 15 and 16
February to protest against the Anglo-American led war in Iraq. The largest protests were
in Rome with some three million people, 1.5 million in Madrid and one million sized
protests in other cities, such as London and Barcelona. These protests, which were part of
a global anti-war movement, reveal the shaping of a cosmopolitan ethic of solidarity and
the centrality of the idea of human dignity and anti-war. The aversion to war in Europe
since 1945 has been a strong force in shaping European consciousness and, with the dark
legacy of the Holocaust, it has made possible a Europeanisation of memory in which older
memories provide a pattern for new memories. It is in this sense, then, possible to say that
there is something binding Europe together.
Discussion of the current situation of Europe in the press and public sphere naturally
focusses on the present. A sociological and historical perspective offers a deeper view
of the current situation that sees in the crises of the moment both continuity and
rupture. Making sense of current times should not lose sight of the continuities of
the past.
This all raises the question what is the present time. Here I think some periodisation
is useful, since the present needs to be defined in relation to temporal horizons. As I
see it, there have been four points of rupture and can be briefly characterised as
follows. There can be no doubt that 1945 marked the threshold to a new phase in
European modernity in which post-war reconstruction and the foundation of the EEC
were the main achievements. It was an era of industrial capitalism and of economic
growth in which a certain balance was forged between capitalism and democracy
(Streeck 2014). The period in which social democracy and the welfare state consoli-
dated entered into crisis in the early 1970s. The new era begins to take shape from
1973 when capitalism enters into a new phase and neo-liberalism by the 1980s emerges
as the novel political force. It was a period when the new or cultural left emerges and
new cleavages are formed. This pattern continues through the next phase, which is
marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Warsaw Pact and the unification
of Germany. From 1990 a New Europe takes shape with the consolidation of the EU
and its later enlargement to include much of the former central and eastern Europe.
This was an era of globalisation and the advancement of the neoliberal project. The
current situation is characterised by the transition to a phase, which is marked by the
global financial crisis of 2007–9 and the related, though different, problem of Greek
debt, the unprecedented migration that followed the collapse of Libya and the war in
Syria, and now Brexit and European wide rise of authoritarian populism. This is the era
in which we are now in and it is not clear what the direction of travel is. In my view,
one of the hallmarks of the present is the crisis of neoliberalism, which ran its course
from the early 1980s to c 2008. The collapse of this ideology has opened up a space for
new visions and ideas.
In this brief outline of the main points of rupture since the middle of the previous
century, I am mainly concerned with stating the case for the presence, in fact, the per-
sistence of continuity across those phases. I do not think, for instance, that the present
day can be in any meaningful way compared with the rise of fascism in Europe in the
1930s. Brexit Britain has become an unpleasant place. Something profoundly changed
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since the 23rd June 2016. However, we do not have a throw-back to 1933 or even 1931.
There is no project of re-armement, despite a rise in hate-crimes, the right-wing popu-
lism does not have militias out on the streets, parliamentary democracy is strong and
there is nothing like spectre of the USSR challenging the West. Capitalism is more or
less safe. Yes, to be sure the left is divided as it always has been, unlike the right.
Authoritarian populism does not have a new ideology to offer in the way that the Hitler
and Mussolini did. Instead, the appeal of authoritarian populism is due to a more
diffuse platform of anti-establishment politics and attacks on cultural pluralism in the
name of the nation first, but where the nation is defined in exclusionary terms to be
what populists declare it to be.
My argument is that there is strong continuity with the post-war project of
reconstruction and peace and that this common ground that constitutes the European
heritage needs to be given greater recognition.
One of the great achievements of European integration is an issue that goes
beyond the integration of states and economies and relates to the person as the
bearer of rights and in particular human rights. As a result of the constitutionalisa-
tion of the EU, a complex framework of rights has been consolidated. The EU is
without doubt a major global champion of human rights. Human rights are deeply
embedded in domestic laws as a result of EU law. Through the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, human rights are
not abstract rights but enshrined in the legal framework of all member states.
Although the EU may not be greatly popular, it has had a positive and far-reaching
impact on the lives of Europeans. It has made possible greater gender equality in
employment and it has brought about the prohibition of discrimination on grounds
such as religion, sexual orientation, disability and age. The upshot of this is that
equality has been given an important basis in European law. It could therefore be
suggested that in certain aspects of the legal framework of the EU, in particular
those that pertain to the rights of the individual, there are wider normative aspects
to European integration and which offer bonds of unity through solidarity.
To the extent to which it still holds normative force, the vision of a post-national
Europe based on citizenship is not entirely devoid of substance. In several publications
Habermas (2001) defended the republican idea of Europe based on citizenship. The
challenges to this normative model are now considerable and derive from systemic fail-
ure due to the nature of the single currency, which has led to new divisions within the
member states. Despite these problems, it is arguably the case that the normative foun-
dation of the EU is the individual, not the state. This is probably the most important
legacy of the EU. It is an example of what I see as the enduring feature of contempor-
ary Europe and which may offer an antidote to its divisions. However, at the moment
these normative ideas around the rights of the individual etc. have set one stratum of
the population – cosmopolitan liberals - against another stratum that sees national
collectivity to be endangered.
The centrality of the individual has been one of the abiding features of the European
legacy. It has been the integral to the liberal and the cosmopolitan tradition of thought.
It is possible to see a clear link between the idea of Europe and the respect for the indi-
vidual. In the cosmopolitical tradition of thought going back to Kant, it was expressed
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in the idea of hospitality. In Perpetual Peace in 1795 Kant established the principle of
hospitality as the defining tenet of cosmopolitanism, which he contrasted to inter-
nationalism, which for Kant was based on treaties between states. Cosmopolitanism, in
contrast, is based on the centrality of the individual and the need for the rights of the
individual to be recognised even where the individual is a foreigner. It is this idea of
cosmopolitan law, rather than the vision of global government, which Kant believed was
desirable but not realistic, that has been the main legacy of modern cosmopolitanism. Its
relevance to contemporary Europe cannot be underestimated.
While liberalism and cosmopolitanism have emphasised the centrality of the individual,
on the other side, is the tradition of collective solidarity as represented by socialism and
its various offshoots, chartism, social liberalism, social democracy. It can be argued that
the concern with social justice is also one of the defining features of European modernity,
an argument I have made in previous publications. A strong current in European history
is resistance to a model of society based on the market. This can be variously related to
anti-capitalist movements from socialism to social liberalism and social democracy. It is
also what underpins the idea of a social model of capitalism that triumphed in western
Europe in the post-1945 period. In the final analysis this is what distinguishes Europe
from the rest of the world, that is the domestication of capitalism by political claims for
social justice. In this sense, then, the language of social justice and solidarity entered into
the political systems of modern Europe in at least two ways. One in the shaping of social
policies, which is often what is meant by solidarity. The other is in a more general norma-
tive conception of society. Both of these senses are also reflected in the core documents of
the EU, for examples solidarity is mentioned in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the
Charter of Fundamental Rights in 2000. In the latter case it signifies social policies and in
the former case a more general and elusive normative conception of society as both a goal
and as an assumption.
What is now needed is a fundamental shift in the very conception of Europe to more
fully capture solidarity. This is more important than issues of mobility, markets or
supranational governance. My analysis suggests that the nation is no longer able to
deliver social justice without connecting with a larger sense of political community.
This may be the most viable opportunity for the reinvention of European political com-
munity. Looking at things in this way also shows how the cosmopolitical perspective
connects with the social justice tradition.
Rather than start with the divisions, I have preferred to begin with an account that
foregrounds the unifying ideas, what I call ideas of Europe. This is also because these
ideas are present and make possible progressive counter-trends that contain within
them the seeds of future possibilities. Moreover, to speak of crisis requires a perspective
on critique, since it makes no sense to speak of something being in crisis if it is not
clear what it is that is in crisis. It is a well-stablished position in German social theory
that crisis and critique are connected.
I am firmly of the belief that cosmopolitical trends are strong. In fact, an emerging
feature of current times is the onset on a new cleavage that can be characterised in
terms of two competing conceptions of the nation, an open versus a closed conception
of the national community. The open one is infused with cosmopolitical currents, while
the closed one is anti-cosmopolitan and animated by a pervasive resentment that en-
compasses anything that cannot be defined through the lens of a narrow view of the
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national community. I am not describing this as one between the nation and Europe,
but an inner conflict or tension within the category of the nation. The major conflicts
of the present are within nations, not between them or between the nation and Europe.
Contemporary societies are highly divided.
There have been two major cleavages that have cut across most (western) European
societies since 1945, but to which we must now add a third cleavage. The first is the
conflict over the distribution of wealth. This cleavage between the classes was
expressed in the established political parties of the Right and Left and did not address
cultural issues (religion, family and patriarchy remained untouched). It has now ceased
to be the dominant cleavage, but is not irrelevant. Since the 1980s another cleavage be-
came apparent, which complicated the older one and in which left versus right lost its
clear-cut edge. The politics of radical pluralism that emerged from the cultural politics
of the new left (e.g. feminism, environmentalism) since the 1960s challenged both the
old left and the established right, but it had to face a new challenge from the New Right
and by the 1990s, the lines of division between the old and new left had become
blurred. Nonetheless there was a new division between cultural pluralists – those who
value quality of life, post-material values, the rights of individuals around gender and
race issues, alternative life styles – and the New Right (who often relied on cultural
authoritarianism, e.g. family and religion, monarchy). To be sure, in this cleavage the
older critique of capitalism lost its potency.
Since the early 2000s, a new cleavage arose following the rise of cosmopolitan
political movements that unlike earlier left-wing movements were not confined to the
parameters of the nation-state and also challenged the very meaning of the nation.
Since the Global Social Forum and anti-capitalism movements such as Occupy Wall
Street since 2008, this cleavage has become a potent structuring force in national and
global politics. The rise of cosmopolitics has increasingly led to a new cleavage between
those who largely identify with the nation and those who do not. This cleavage is driven
by one-nation nationalism and populist reaction to globalisation, but is also antagonis-
tic to radical cultural pluralism; it draws on right and left currents. We are thus witnes-
sing a situation of the diminishing influence of the national culture on many people
whose habitus is increasingly more plural, if not hybrid, and whose lifeworld has been
transformed by anti-authoritarian and post-material values. This value divergence is
now very great and underpinned by very different kinds of work and increased di-
versity. In the UK this group is likely to be Europeanised in their self-identification
and in their life-styles, but will reflect different positions within the left/right wing
divide. The Brexit Referendum is an example of this division within the national
community to a point that the very unity of the national culture is in question
(Delanty 2017). The two sides cross-cut the other cleavages. The cosmopoliticals
(the Remain voters) are in the tradition of the new left, the cultural left, but also
include neo-liberals and Euro-technocrats; the Nationals, the Brexiters, include the
Old Left as well as the authoritarian nationalists, as in the Tory right/UKIP. This
latter group has not been a significant force in British politics until recently. This is
generally the case across. France, which narrowly escaped the election of Marine Le
Pen to the presidency in 2017, is an even more dramatic example of a country that
invented the Right and Left, but has now redrawn the political landscape between
the Centre and the Extreme Right.
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It is very likely that this cleavage will be the defining feature of European politics for
some time to come. These problems are not specific to Europe. Trump is the product
of a similar dynamic. Many of the world’s major democracies – the USA, Turkey,
Brazil, even Russia – are beset by internal conflict along similar lines. The full implica-
tions of Brexit, Trump and the assent of radical authoritarian populism remain to be
seen. In view of the immediate aftermath in the second half of 2016, it is now all the
more evident that the post-1945 social and political order has come to an end. This
was first heralded with the rise of neo-liberalism in the 1980s. The neoliberal revolution
and the concomitant unleashing of the forces of economic and technological globalisa-
tion offered a vision of a possible alternative for much of the 1990s until the great crisis
of 2008 when, private debt became an unsustainable substitute for public debt. The
period of crisis from 2008 can be seen in the prophetic words of Antonio Gramsci in
his Prison Notebooks an interregnum: ‘The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the
old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid
symptoms appear.’ Brexit and Trump are products of the interregnum. They are less an
antidote than a symptom of the problem. What is this problem?
The problem is in part the false solutions that neoliberalism gave to the world for the
problems of capitalist accumulation, which in valorising the market above all else have
now exacerbated the fiscal crisis of the state to which neoliberalism was supposed to be
the solution. Neoliberalism deployed the state in order to liberate the market, but in so
doing it destroyed the integrative capacities of the state. Whether or not there will be a
Polanyi style counter-movement in the form of an affirmation of social protection
against the market remains to be seen. It is evident that this counter-movement will
not come from authoritarian populism. Yet, much of the discontent that drives this
does come from the social malaise created by capitalism. This certainly does not
explain the phenomenon of authoritarian populism entirely – take the examples of the
Netherlands and Austria – but it does account for its impetus. Variations certainly
exist: Brexit is to a large extent driven by neoliberals. The British Brexiters see the EU
as imposing limits that might be cast off in a new kind of buccaneering capitalism on
the high seas. Where is democracy in all of this?
The current situation leaves democracy in a poor condition. Capitalism is undermining
democracy at a time when democracy itself is taking illiberal forms. Here again Brexit
looks large. Referendums, for example, can easily be instruments of authoritarian democ-
racy when they seek to address major societal issues that are undefined and have multiple
meanings (as, for example, what it means ‘to leave’ the EU). While a serious challenge for
the left and for progressive politics, it would be a mistake to see authoritarian populism as
something fundamentally new and aberrant revolutionary force that is contrary to democ-
racy. It is rather protean, contradictory and volatile and enabled by democracy, which
allows for popular expressions of resentment. The success of right-wing populism in
Europe and in the USA can also be attributed to the fact that mainstream democracy –
the main political parties and the wider public sphere – has nurtured its values. As David
Runciman (2013) has argued, the factors that make democracy successful – its flexibility,
variety, and responsiveness – also serve to undermine it and encourage democracies to
make mistakes. Democracies have safeguards against tyranny and demagogues, but ultim-
ately cannot stop them nor prevent crises. The success of democracy is a trap, ‘a confi-
dence trap’ that fails to warn that it also includes the bad as well as the good. Jan-Werner
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Müller (2016: 6) has made a similar argument that the danger to democracies is not in
some kind of a counter-democratic ideology, but comes from within democracy, as in
claims of populists ‘to make good on democracy’s highest values.’
In other words, right-wing populism is not a new or aberrant political
phenomenon but is a radicalisation of issues and ideas in mainstream politics. One
powerful source is popular resentment, which can be target against almost any-
thing. This has already had considerable impact in changing the terms of much of
public debate and many of the mainstream political parties on the right have been
close to its values, e.g. the Spanish Popular Party, the British Conservative Party,
and the French Republican Party. In the Nordic countries, the success of right
wing populism can be in part attributed to social democracy in so far as it pro-
duced a vision of a homogenous society. Populist politics owes much of its success
to radicalising centre right and centre left values. Thus, while radicalising cultural
authoritarianism, right-wing populism often takes on board left wing social values
in relation to social security and equality. Right-wing populism amplifies the
defects and failures of liberal democracy. Counter-strategies based only on anti-populism
are therefore not only destined to fail, but will fuel the very forces that authoritarian
populism thrives on, since the message can only be let’s trust the elites.
While the right can cope with authoritarian populism, the left is caught in a trap,
since many of its supporters are drawn to right-wing populism. It makes no sense
calling for anti-populist politics, when the discontent that fuels it is not given an
alternative political form. While there are some examples of left-wing populism,
they are relatively marginal and do not have the capacity to mobilise mass publics
around a different set of values. Public discussion on the pros and contras of
European integration concentrate too much on mobility and, as the Brexit issue
revealed, too much on its economic merits.
I have concentrated on the internal cleavages within national political communi-
ties, but of course there are other ones: The division between East and West has
now been complicated by a division between North and South, or between creditor
and debtor countries. Here, too, the divisions are fuelled by capitalism and exacer-
bated by the structural flaws of the single currency (Offe 2015). The left was never
truly happy with European integration and initially there was some resistance. But
the politics of the centre left by the 1980s had become fully Europeanised. This
has now led to a situation in which the left has no real rationale. The ProEU
movement in the UK – which probably commands a majority – has only instrumental
arguments around mobility and the advantages of the single market. The Brexit side has
no instrumental arguments for Brexit but emotive and non-rational values that have
considerable support. What is needed is a left-wing populism. This cannot be a left-wing
Brexit, but one that is European in its-self-understanding. I have argued here strongly
for greater recognition of the European heritage as a carrier of the cosmopolitan values
of solidarity and social justice, respect for the individual. These need to be given a strong
cosmopolitical form and identified not only with the Europe of the EU but the Europe of
nations. As I argued, the real conflict is not between Europe and its nations but different
and competing conceptions of what the nation stands for. I believe it is possible for the
idea of the nation to be given a more European identity and in a way that avoids the
populism vs. anti-populism.
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Endnotes
1This essay was delivered as a keynote lecture, Böckler Foundation, Dresden,
Germany, 27th October, 2017. I am grateful to Professor Heinz Sünker for inviting me
to give the lecture. The essays draws from my book, The European Heritage: A Critical
Re-Interpretation (Routledge, 2018).
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